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Incentives and Creativity
Research Question  
and Relevance
Key Messages
Essential Issues
In knowledge-intensive economies, ideas and innovation are key drivers of a company’s competitive-
ness and success. In such a climate a company must strategise methods designed to incentivize the 
generation of new ideas and build a culture that rewards the production of knowledge. Many schol-
ars have suggested that motivating creative performance is fundamentally different from motivating 
performance in simple and routine tasks. Nevertheless, economic studies investigated the effect of 
financial incentives on employees’ performance mainly by observing employees performing simple 
and routine tasks while effects on creative performance have received little scientific attention so 
far. For routine tasks, a myriad of studies confirm that financial incentives have a positive effect on 
performance because employees increase their effort insofar as their potential benefit from addi-
tional output exceeds the cost of that effort. Moreover, a substantial number of studies document 
that employees’ performance is not only triggered by rewards contingent on performance but em-
ployees do also reciprocate financial rewards that are allocated independently of individual perfor-
mance, such as wage premia, with an increase in their performance. However, it remains unclear to 
which extent previous results can be transferred to creative tasks. The present research covers two 
empirical studies that investigate whether financial rewards such as performance independent bo-
nuses and performance rewards foster creativity and idea generation among employees and to what 
extent the effect of incentives differs depending on the type of reward that is offered.
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The first study, a laboratory-based experiment, shows that competition for a financial reward 
significantly increases performance in both a routine and a creative task. By contrast, a wage 
premium not contingent on performance will result in an increase in performance that is driven 
by reciprocity of experimental subjects only when the task is a simple, routine one, while perfor-
mance of a creative task is otherwise unaffected. Accordingly, a positive reciprocal performance 
effect of performance non-contingent wage premia appears to be highly dependent on the nature 
of the task. The second study, an empirical analysis of personnel data from a large software com-
pany, looks at the impact of an incentive scheme designed to reward employees for coming up 
with novel ideas intended to add value for the customer. The findings suggest that the rewards 
have the intended consequence and increase employee participation in idea generation as well 
as improve the quality of the ideas submitted.
Key Messages
We have conducted two studies addressing the question as to whether financial rewards foster 
employees’ creativity and the generation of new ideas.
In the first study, we compare the efficiency of two financial reward types on performance in a 
creative and a routine task in a laboratory experiment. A controlled experiment allows us to hold 
constant certain factors that might otherwise influence the extent of the difference in effect be-
tween tasks and rewards. Our results show that performance-contingent rewards for good relative 
performance, in this case tournament prizes, significantly increase performance in both routine 
and creative tasks. Performance non-contingent rewards, such as a wage premium, also positive-
ly affected performance to a significant degree in the simple task, as previous studies have also 
found. The results of the present study, however, indicate that reciprocal responses to a perfor-
mance non-contingent wage premium cannot be discerned when the task is a creative one. Accord-
ingly, the effect of wage premia on work motivation seems to depend on the type of task. Given 
that the creative task involves a significantly higher level of intrinsic motivation, we suggest that 
intrinsic motivation is an important determinant and must therefore be taken into account when 
designing incentive schemes. Our results suggest that performance-contingent rewards like those 
offered in a financial tournament can be a cost-effective tool to incentivize innovation whereas 
performance non-contingent rewards do not pay off for the company.
Our second study complements the experimental analysis by examining personnel data from a 
large software company that introduced an incentive scheme for an employee idea platform. The 
latter targeted at providing process and product improvement ideas to customers. The results 
show that the creation of novel ideas can also be affected by rewards substantially in the field. 
The implementation of the reward scheme increased not only the number of employees partici-
pating in the process of generating ideas but it also improved the quality of the ideas submitted.
Research Question and Relevance
Most studies that set out to examine the impact of incentives on motivation and productivity confirm 
what standard economic theory predicts: financial incentives have a positive effect on performance 
because employees increase their effort insofar as their potential benefit from additional output ex-
ceeds the cost of that effort. This is demonstrated by tournament schemes, for instance, which reward 
employees on the basis of their relative performance. However, explicit financial incentives are not 
the only way of triggering employees’ performance. The established literature on “gift-exchanges” 
documents that employees will reciprocate financial rewards that are allocated independently of indi-
vidual performance, such as wage premia, with an increase in their performance. However, it remains 
unclear to which extent previous results can be transferred to different types of work tasks as most 
studies have been conducted with simple and routine tasks where output is easily observable.  
Developed countries progressively transform into knowledge-based economies, in which many 
jobs require non-routine problem solving skills, as the market demands continuous improvement 
of companies’ products and services. Successful innovation is the result of a persistent “trial and 
error” process, which requires employees’ creative thinking as well as high work motivation. Many 
scholars and practitioners in the field have suggested that motivating creative performance is fun-
damentally different from motivating routine performance because it is considered to be more de-
pendent on intrinsic motivation, more cognitively demanding, riskier, and of less certain value than 
routine performance. Accordingly, it is an empirical question whether and to what extent the effect of 
rewards on productivity might differ when dealing with simple, routine tasks or with creative ones.
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Results in Detail
In the first study, we implemented a laboratory experiment where participants could earn a sub-
stantial amount of money. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were assigned to act 
in the role of an employer while other participants were assigned the role of employees. Each 
employer was then randomly assigned to a group of four employees. In the course of the experi-
ment, participants were asked to perform either a simple or a creative task, in three consecutive 
“rounds”. Both employers and employees received a fixed wage in each round, no matter the type 
of task. Beyond this, employers received a variable pay component the amount of which was deter-
mined based on the sum performance of their four employees. This experimental design allowed 
us to investigate reciprocal responses to treatment interventions that more closely simulate real 
life conditions. Depending on the experi-
mental treatment, employers had the op-
tion of implementing additional rewards 
in the second “round” of work. Depend-
ing on the treatment group, this reward 
could be either a performance non-contin-
gent wage premium for all employees or a 
performance-contingent tournament prize.
In order to evaluate the effects of differ-
ent incentive schemes on performance, 
we compared the performance increase 
in the control group with the increase in 
each respective treatment group in order 
to control for baseline differences as well 
as for a temporal learning curve. Our experimental design also allowed us to compare ex-ante 
incentive as well as ex-post effects of the rewards to a second control group which received only 
performance feedback without any monetary reward. In this way we were able to distinguish any 
ex-post effects of winning or losing a tournament from the mere feedback effect.
The results indicate that a performance-contingent reward leads to a substantial increase in per-
formance in both types of tasks within a tournament scheme. By contrast, treatment groups who 
received the performance non-contingent wage premium evinced a surprising asymmetry: while 
participants performing a routine task reacted reciprocally, no such comparable effect was found 
for the creative task. Recent behavioural studies suggest that individuals react positively to benev-
olent actions, such as performance independent wage premia, with an increase in performance. 
However, when it comes to creative tasks, we do not find any such an effect. Psychological research 
may offer theories about the mechanisms at work: motivation may be undermined when an in-
trinsically motivated task (such as a creative work) is rewarded per se, without that reward being 
linked to actual performance. Making the reward for creative work contingent on outstanding per-
formance, by contrast, strengthens perceived self-determination and, hence, fosters intrinsic mo-
tivation. Our laboratory study provides causal evidence for this asymmetry.
In our second study we collaborated with a large software company to analyse the effect of a re-
ward scheme aimed at increasing both the number as well as the quality of ideas submitted to 
the company’s internal idea platform. The company randomised several of their key accounts in-
to either a reward group or a control group. The new reward scheme was only introduced to the 
former. In order to study the effects of its implementation, we compared the submission of ide-
as between accounts acting under and those acting without the new reward scheme, and at the 
same time we analysed the development of idea generation over time.
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The bars show the differences in performance (in %) between treatment groups and the respective control group. For instance, the announcement of a 
performance bonus in a creative task yields a performance which is 60 % larger than the performance in a control group where no reward is announced.
 Source: own presentation 
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This latter detail is important in that it has allowed us to take into account initial differences in per-
formance between accounts in the reward and the control groups. Moreover, our approach controls 
for any temporal trends that might arise in the long-term. We looked at a variety of dependent varia-
bles such as the number of ideas submitted, the number of employees participating in the ideation 
process, the number of ideas per participating employee, and the quality of the ideas submitted.
The results of our second study suggest that employees do indeed respond to the incentives of-
fered. While the overall number of ideas remains the same, the participant base is broader under 
a reward system, i.e. a larger number of employees participate in the ideation process. Addition-
ally, the quality of submitted ideas as measured as a percentage of submitted ideas that pass 
the internal review process and are eventually implemented is higher for accounts being offered 
rewards than it is for those who are not. 
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